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Comments and Casenotes
Expert Opinion And The Ultimate Issue Doctrine
1
Shivers v. Carnaggio

A housewife who received a back injury when a taxicab
in which she was riding was struck in the rear by an automobile brought suit with her husband against both drivers
and the taxicab company. Plaintiffs recovered a small
judgment and appealed, claiming inter alia, that they were
unduly hampered in presenting their evidence because
their medical experts, a general practitioner and an orthopedic specialist, were not permitted to state the percentage
by which they thought the plaintiff was disabled as a
result of her injury. The trial court, in striking the reference to percentage of disability, explained that the medical
witnesses could "refer to a degree of limitation in percentages.''2 The Maryland Court of Appeals held the reference proper and reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial, finding an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
It was the defendant-appellee's contention that the function of the medical expert is limited to the determination
of the extent to which a person has lost the motion of a
particular portion of his body, and cannot be enlarged to
allow such expert to give an opinion as to the effect of such
immobility on the habits and activities of the patient, for
such evidence as to disability would invade the province of
the jury. The Court of Appeals rejected this and ruled
that a physician who has, in addition to his medical knowledge, familiarity with the activities and occupation of his
patient, may express an opinion as to the extent to which
the loss of motion or anatomical disability will cause
economic disability.'
Two related problems are involved in this decision. The
first (covered in this Note) is whether the opinion rule forbids expert opinion as to an ultimate issue; and the second
(covered in an ensuing companion Note) is whether, as a
matter of testimonial qualification, the medical expert is
1223 Md. 585, 165 A. 2d 898 (1960).
2Emphasis supplied. The lower court stated to the medical witness:
"[Liet me caution you not to refer to percentages such as you previously
mentioned. * * * If you want to refer to a degree of limitation in percentages, that is all right, but not as you have previously attempted
to do." Id., 587.
SSupra, n. 1, 588.
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competent to discuss the topic of disability to perform a
particular job.
The Maryland Court of Appeals says in the Shivers
decision that, subject to the trial judge's sound discretion,
any expert opinion testimony is admissible if it will be of
value to the jury. That an expert opinion may touch upon
an ultimate issue apparently no longer matters. This case
confirms a modern trend, observable in Maryland and elsewhere, toward liberalization of the opinion rule. The early
Maryland cases ruled inadmissible expert opinion evidence
bearing upon an ultimate issue in the proceedings, on the
theory that this 4invaded the province or usurped the function of the jury.
Typical of the older cases is McClees v. Cohen,5 a suit
in trespass against a dentist for the wrongful extraction
of two teeth. Exception was taken to the refusal of the
trial court to allow the dentist's counsel to ask his expert
witness if in his opinion the defendant "exercised the ordinary skill that an ordinary skilled dentist would exercise."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that
to accept such testimony would be to allow the witness
to usurp the function or invade the province of the jury.
It should be noted here that these expressions "usurp"
and "invade" are not to be taken literally; but as
MCCORMICK points out, they do suggest the danger that
the jury may forego its own analysis of the facts and bow
to the opinion of an influential witness.'
Some earlier cases excluding testimony on an ultimate issue are:
Baltimore Belt R. Co. v. Sattler, 100 Md. 306, 59 A. 654 (1905), where
expert testimony was held inadmissible to show amount of damage caused
by smoke and vapors from passing railroad; Hanrahan v. City of Baltimore, 114 Md. 517, 80 A. 312 (1911), where the question asked was if
"due care" was used in locating a sewer; Baltimore C. & A. Ry. Co. v.
Moon, 118 Md. 380, 84 A. 536 (1912); Capital Traction Co. v. Contner,
120 Md. 78, 87 A. 904 (1913), where a lay witness was not allowed to
express his opinion whether motorman of streetcar could have stopped
before accident; Commonwealth Bank v. Goodman, 128 Md. 452, 464, 97
A. 1005 (1916), where the witness was not permitted to say whether a
bank teller in paying out money was "justified"; Western Md. R.R. Co. v.
Jacques, 129 Md. 400, 99 A. 549 (1916), where question concerned the
amount of damage to lumber; McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124
(1930), where question was whether dentist used ordinary skill. See also
Bode v. Coal Co., 172 Md. 406, 191 A. 685 (1937) ; Blinder v. Monoghan,
171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31 (1936) ; Barber v. Knipp & Sons, 164 Md. 55, 163 A.
862 (1933) ; Griffith v. Pullman Co., 142 Md. 514, 121 A. 362 (1923). But
Cf. Consol. Gas Co. v. Smith, 109 Md. 186, 72 A. 651 (1909) which did
allow the expert testimony, but only after distinguishing Baltimore Belt
R. Co. v. Sattler, supra. Some of these cases may also have involved a
more tenable objection: that the expert was giving an opinion which included a conclusion of law, e.g., that certain conduct was negligent. See
2 MORGAN,
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, 158 Md. 00, 148 A. 124 (1930).
SMCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954)

§ 12.

(1957).
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The early Maryland position is stated in Baltimore Belt
R. Co. v. Sattler:
"There is a general concurrence of authority and decisions in support of the proposition that expert testimony is not admissible upon a question which the
Court or jury can themselves decide upon the facts;
or stated in other words, if the relation of facts and
their probable results can be determined without
special skill or study, the facts themselves must be
given in evidence and the conclusions or inferences
drawn by the jury. * * *
It is not desirable to enlargethe limits within which
expert testimony is admissible,and whenever the ultimate fact to be proved is, from the nature of the issue,
especially confided to'7 the jury, such evidence should
be rigidly excluded.
While the first sentence of the above quotation would be
recognized as still applicable today, the Court of Appeals
has certainly repudiated the italicized portion of the statement representing the strict early Maryland position.
Relying upon the more recent decisions, Judge Hammond in the Shivers opinion points out that several Maryland cases' have indicated an agreement with WiGMoRE
and McCoRMICK, both of whom reject the soundness of the
ultimate issue rule.9 By hypothesis, the expert, whenever
he is properly permitted to give his opinion, is doing something for the jury which it could not so well do for itself.
To this extent, the province of the jury is "invaded" and its
function "usurped" whether or not the opinion happens to
touch the ultimate issue. There is little reason for denying expert opinion on an ultimate issue if its necessity on
other issues is admitted. In either case the jury is given
considerable help, but remains free to assess the proper
weight of the testimony. Furthermore, the rule may be
7 100 Md. 306, 333-334 (1905). Emphasis added.
8
Judge Hammond cites: Insurance Co. v. Berlin, 185 Md. 404, 45 A. 2d 90
(1945) ; Casualty Insurance Co. v. Zajic, 175 Md. 368, 1 A. 2d 903 (1938) ;
Travelers Insurance C. v. Needle, 171 Md. 517, 189 A. 216 (1937) ; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 A. 838 (1934).
9 See 7 WIGMORE, EVIDNcE (3d ed. 1940) § 1921 where it is stated:
"When all is said, it remains simply one of those Impracticable and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle." Also see
McCoRmiox, EVDENCE (1954) § 12, where the author states: "It is believed, however, that this general rule is unduly restrictive, is pregnant
with close questions of application, and often unfairly obstructs the party's
presentation of his case."
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baffling to all concerned and for this reason difficult to
apply; it is by no means clear exactly how close to a central question an issue must be to be ultimate. Too often
it does nothing but hinder the presentation of the true
circumstances of the case.
The four cases cited by Judge Hammond" show the
shift in the thinking of the Court of Appeals in regard to
the ultimate issue doctrine." In Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zajic, 2
an attending physician was permitted to give his opinion
that the plaintiff had permanently lost the use of his entire
left hand and foot within the meaning of a provision of the
insurance policy, and was disabled from continuing his
work. In the Brookman, Needle, and Berlin cases 3 medical
witnesses were allowed at the trial to state that the insured were totally disabled under the applicable provisions
of the policies, and in each case on appeal the argument
was rejected that this brought before the jury an opinion
on the ultimate issue which was for the jury to decide. In
each of these cases the Court of Appeals merely held there
was no reversible error; and in the Needle case, the Court
pointed out that the form of the questions propounded
may be the object of some criticism - though not amounting to reversible error.
A more appropriate case evidencing the change in
Maryland thought on the expert opinion problem is
Langenfelder v. Thompson. 4 This case involved a personal injury suit in which a doctor was asked his opinion
as to the cause of the plaintiff's injury. His answer was:
"The accident in all probability."' 5 An objection on the
ground that this opinion invaded the province of the jury
was overruled. The Court quoted at length from an opinion
of Judge Van Devanter in United States Smelting Co. v.
Parry" where it was said that the rule restricting opinion
testimony on an ultimate issue was never intended to close
any reasonable avenue to the truth and that the modern
trend is to give as wide a scope as possible in the investigation, leaving to the trial judge a discretion in determining
what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate
facts and to reject testimony having no legitimate bearing
"0Supra, n. 8.
"See the extensive annotation in 111 A.L.R. 603 (1937)
Testimony as to Disability."
- 175 Md. 368, 1 A. 2d 903 (1938).

" Supra, n. 8.
',179 Md. 502, 20 A. 2d 491 (1941).
Id., 504.
18166 F. 407 (8th Cir. 1909).

on "Expert
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or tending to prejudice the minds of the jurors. A witness
possessed of special skill or training may give an opinion
when it will aid the jury, "the true test being, not the total
dependence of the jury upon such testimony, but their inability to judge for themselves as well as is the witness."'"
This principle was later followed in Empire State Ins.
Co. v. Guerriero,8 a suit on certain fire insurance policies
covering "explosions" in which a heating expert was
allowed to categorize an occurrence as an explosion. 9
Citing and quoting from Langenfelder v. Thompson," the
Court held the expert testimony as to the cause of the
occurrence admissible since special training and skill was
necessary to the formation of a rational conclusion.2 '
Now with the Shivers decision perhaps finally fixing the
Maryland position, the opinion rule, in regard to expert
testimony, by one competent to speak on the matter, should
become merely a rule of preference operating to exclude
relevant testimony only on the ground that it can be conveniently presented in a form more easily understood by a
jury.22 The Shivers case places the admissibility of such
" Id.,
'8

411.

193 Md. 506, 69 A. 2d 259 (1949).

1'The Court stated:

"If the facts can be intelligently understood by the jury and they
can form a reasonable opinion from the facts for themselves, there is
no reason to admit the opinion evidence of anyone. However, when the
question involved is such that jurors of ordinary judgment and experience are incompetent to draw their own conclusions from the facts
presented and intelligently decide the question before them, without
,the aid of expert testimony, this opinion testimony is a notable
exception to the well known rules of evidence. This exception should
be applied with the greatest caution and discrimination ......
Id., 514.
10Supra, n. 14.
1 Also see Starr v. Oriole Cafeteria, 182 Md. 214, 34 A. 2d 335 (1943) in
agreement with the principle stated.
I It is not clear what effect the Shivers doctrine, dealing solely in the
area of expert testimony, may have upon the application of the ultimate
issue rule to lay testimony.
The lay opinion rule originally purported to require lay witnesses to
confine their testimony to facts, and to obstain from expressions of belief,
impressions, or opinions. A clear cut distinction between fact and opinion
is in fact impossible, and even if distinction were possible, it would not
provide a sensible basis for a rule excluding opinion evidence. See
7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1919. As McCoRAtic,
EVIDENCE
(1954) § 11 puts it: "It is believed that the standard actually applied by
,the trial judges of today approaches more nearly the principle espoused by
Wigmore, namely that the opinion should be rejected only when it is
superfluous in the sense that it will be of no value to the jury." This view
is illustrated by Enoch Co. v. Johnson, 183 Md. 326, 330, 37 A. 2d 901
(1944) where the trial judge's admission of the plaintiff's statement, "It
looked like to avoid or keep from hitting that automobile that he swung
over and hit me," was approved on the ground that it was not a "conclusion" but an "impression based on facts relating to an accident which
the witness experienced." The plaintiff's statement is plainly not observed
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testimony up to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
If this testimony has no legitimate bearing on the question
at issue, if it will unduly prejudice the minds of the jurors,
if the witness lacks the necessary special training or experience, or if his opinion is not necessary to aid the jury in
reaching a correct conclusion, the testimony will be excluded. But to have a set rule of law, that an opinion on
an ultimate issue to be considered by the jury is inadmissible, is impractical and too often obstructs a party's
presentation of the true facts of his case. The opinion must
of course be solidly based on satisfactory data - the quality
23
of which can always be brought out on cross examination.
DONALD NEEDLE
fact; it includes an inference as to the driver's mental processes, whether
it is tagged, "conclusion" or "impression."
Whether this modern trend will extend in Maryland to liberalizing the
old rule excluding lay opinion on the ultimate issue remains to be seen.
The older cases in point have consistently adhered to the view that an
opinion or conclusion of a non-expert witness which is determinative of
an ultimate issue should be excluded as being an invasion of the province
of the jury. Some representative cases excluding lay testimony on an
ultimate issue are: Tall v. Steam Packet Co., 90 Md. 248, 44 A. 1007
(1899), where question was asked if steamboat captain could have prevented altercation by acting more promptly; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Ring, 102 Md. 677, 62 A. 801 (1906), where the question concerned
the amount of damage to certain trees; Fletcher v. Dixon, 107 Md. 420,
68 A. 875 (1908), where question concerned whether it was safe for the
plaintiff to drive a particular horse; Weilbacher v. J. W. Putts Co., 123
Md. 249, 91 A. 343 (1914), where question was asked an experienced painter
if the suspension of a stage above a sidewalk made the use of the sidewalk
dangerous (possibly expert, rather than lay testimony) ; County Comrs v.
Bel Air Sub. Imp. Assn., 134 Md. 548, 107 A. 348 (1919), where lay testimony was held inadmissible as to whether certain work was done according to the requirement of a contract; Bode v. Coal Co., 172 Md. 406, 191 A.
685 (1937), where the question concerned the point at which an automobile had been damaged. No Court of Appeals case in the last 25 years
has been found which excluded lay opinion on the ultimate issue. The
reasoning in the instant case would seem as compelling when applied to
lay opinion as to expert, once the practical necessity of conveying the
necessary information to the jury in opinion form, if it is to be conveyed
at all, is conceded.
opE, op. cit. supra, n. 9, § 1929 quite aptly sums up the situation
2 WIG
when he states:
"[A] single erroneous ruling upon the single trifling answer of one
witness out of a dozen or more in a trial occupying a day may overturn the whole result and cause a double expense of time, money,
and effort; and we perceive the absurdly unjust effects of the rule. Add
finally the utter impossibility of a consistent application of the rule,
and the consequent uncertainty of the law, and we understand how
much more it makes for injustice rather than justice. It has done
more than any one rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards
a state of legalized gambling."

